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ABSTRACT 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 included updated fuel 
economy standards for light-duty vehicles in order to reduce the dependency on oil 
and emission of greenhouse gases in the US. The new Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards not only mandate higher fuel economy standards -
measured as miles per gallon traveled - but also implement the standards in such a 
way as to stimulate technological innovation and competitiveness of the US domestic 
manufacturers relative to their Japanese counterparts. In this sense, the new 
legislation, a so-called attribute-based system defining CAFE standards individually 
with respect to type of vehicle, does not encourage downsizing as a path to achieving 
better fuel economies compared with what had been the case during the period of 
compliance with the 1975 standards. 
The purpose of this study is to model the US automobile industry's path to 
compliance with the new higher CAFE standards. To model this transition, we will 
concentrate on Toyota and General Motors (GM), two leading manufacturers whose 
combined market share in the US is about 40% as of April 2008. Toyota and GM's 
certain characteristics make this selection fruitful. First, trucks make up a larger share 
of GM's production. Second, Toyota has a smaller fleet and the Prius technology to 
begin with that help Toyota meet the standards set for cars as of today. According to 
our projections, GM needs to undergo a more drastic transformation to meet 
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the standards set for 2015 by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA). Slightly smaller cars and trucks and technological innovation bettering the 
fuel economy of the pure gasoline-powered vehicles and the introduction of hybrids 
appear to be the recipe for hitting the 2015 standards. We conclude that CAFE 
standards stimulate technological innovation and help domestic manufacturers like 
GM stay competitive. However, the latter will also be dependent on the vehicle mix 
as consumer preferences shift towards smaller and more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
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In the fall of 2007 when oil prices reached 100 dollars a barrel without any 
prospect of falling back down soon, the need for government regulation to diminish 
dependency on oil consumption became more compelling than ever. Given that 
passenger cars and light-trucks (hereafter, 'light-duty vehicles') account for 
approximately 40% of all US oil consumption, updating 1975 fuel economy, or so 
called Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, unsurprisingly found its 
way onto the policy agenda. Gasoline consumption of light-duty vehicles not only 
deepens energy issues but also has proved to be one of the primary sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions - 20% of total emissions - seen as responsible for global 
warming (Environmental Protection Agency, hereafter EPA). 
These two major public concerns, energy security and climate change, were 
the main motivations behind the new legislation that proposed to mandate higher 
CAFE standards for motor vehicles, measured as 'miles per gallon' or MPG. To this 
end, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) in December 
2007. The new legislation is seen as a major step to improve fuel economy of 
automobiles produced in the US. The new regulation on CAFE standards was meant 
to improve the previous standards enacted in 1975 by mandating for the first time 
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that the US automobile industry meet at least an average 35 mpg standard for all 
domestically produced cars and light-trucks (Sport Utility Vehicles or SUVs, pickup 
trucks, vans and minivans) by 2020. The new legislation means a 40% increase in 
fuel economy from the current industry average of 25 mpg. 
Four months after the release of the regulation NHTSA, which sets fuel 
economy standards for cars and light-trucks sold by all manufacturers in the US and 
is responsible for reinforcing CAFE in cooperation with Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), proposed even more aggressive standards for automobile 
manufacturers to comply with. NHTSA's proposal, released on April 22, 2008, 
requires an average of 35.7 mpg for cars and 28.6 mpg for light-trucks to ensure a 
36.1 mpg industry average for light-duty vehicles by 2015. 
Historically speaking, improvements in automotive fuel economy led by 1975 
regulation have been motivated by higher oil prices followed by supply shocks in the 
beginning of 70s. The first regulation introduced CAFE standards to automobile 
manufacturers in 1975. After the introduction of the first fuel economy standards in 
1975, manufacturers managed to comply with fuel economy standards mainly by 
producing smaller and lighter vehicles, details of which will be discussed below. On 
the other hand, 2007 standards, which are 'attribute-based', will encourage producers 
to improve their vehicles' fuel economies by technological innovation instead of 
adjusting the size of their current fleet. 
This thesis aims at answering the following questions: 
(i) How have automobile manufacturers complied with 1975 CAFE standards? 
(ii) What are the differences between the current and previous standards? 
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(iii) How do new standards work and stimulate innovation? 
(iv) How will GM and Toyota achieve 2015 fuel economy targets set by NHTSA? 
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CHAPTER n 
1975 CAFE STANDARDS 
Introduction of fuel economy standards 
The US Congress first introduced CAFE Standards as part of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. This came about two years after Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) oil embargo started. As a result of the 
embargo, oil prices skyrocketed reaching $47.63 per barrel (in 2007 dollars) by 1975 
up from $18.35 in 1970 and continued rising peaking at $82.70 by the end of 1981. 
As a response to the oil crisis, Congress introduced CAFE standards that applied to 
vehicles with the model year of 1978 and beyond. Automobile manufacturers were 
mandated to produce passenger cars with average 18 mpg by 1978 and gradually 
improve fuel economy up to 27.5 mpg for cars with model year of 1985 and beyond. 
The NHTSA was given the authority to set separate CAFE standards for light-trucks 
starting with model year of 1979. 
Reaction to new CAFE standards 
As result of both rising oil prices and the CAFE legislation, vehicle fuel 
economy rapidly increased from its 1975 levels throughout the early 1980s for both 
passenger cars and light-trucks. Passenger car fuel economy increased from 17 mpg 
CHAPTER II 
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in 1978 to 22.2 in 1982, a more than 30% increase, while light-duty truck fuel 
economy rose from 13.7 mpg to 19 mpg during the same period. After 1982, 
improvements in fuel economy had slowed down and come to a halt. Specifically 
speaking, passenger cars reached their peak in 1988 at 28.2 mpg and light-trucks in 
1987 at 20.5 mpg. 
The pattern of fuel economy between 1975 and 2007 and its relation to car 
size/weight is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Fuel economy improvements between 
1975 and 1987/8 could be attributable to a growing share of smaller/lighter cars and 
trucks as well as technological improvements by automobile manufacturers: "The 
rapid rise in fuel economy in the late 1970s was due to a mix of efficiency 
improvements and downgrading of utility in the form of reduced size, power and 
elimination of accessories and amenities (such as air conditioning)" (Nicholas P. 
Lutsey and Daniel Sperling, 2005 p. 8). As seen on Figures 1 and 2, vehicle weights 
declined sharply and reached their lowest point in 1987. During the same period, fuel 
efficiencies improved significantly and met the standards implying a strong 
correlation between weight and fuel economy. 
How do we account for the slowdown from 1987/8 forward? One main reason 
for the slowdown after 1987/8 could be thought to be decreasing gasoline prices 
starting from 1982. The pattern of fuel economy between 1975 and 2007 and its 
relation to gas prices can be followed in Figures 3 and 4. In 1982 the oil prices 
reversed the trend displayed since 1973. If gas prices could be ruled out as a factor, 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Average car fuel efficiency (mpg) 
Average car weight (lbs) 
Figure 1: The interaction between 'average car fuel economy' and 'car 
weight' between 1975 and 2007 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Average truck fuel efficiency (mpg) 
Average truck weight (lbs) 
Figure 2: The interaction between 'average truck fuel economy' and 'truck 
weight' between 1975 and 2007 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Gasoline price (cent/gallon) 
Average car fuel efficiency (mpg) 
Figure 3: The interaction between 'average car fuel economy' and ' 
gasoline prices' between 1975 and 2007 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency (2007) and Energy 
Information Administration (2008) 
As Paul R. Portney et al. (2003) put it, 
If the fuel economy improvements of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were a response only to rising gasoline prices, we might have expected 
a gradual fall-off in fuel economy in the years following 1982; it is 
likely that the CAFE standards established a floor preventing such a 
decline, (p. 204) 
Fuel economies had declined by average 9% between 1987/8-2004 as seen 
captured by the shaded areas on Figures 3 and 4. Stable oil prices and the lack of 
public pressure for higher CAFE standards have been responsible for the regress. The 
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1990 
Gasoline prices (cent/gallon) 
Average truck fuel efficiency (mpg) 
Figure 4: The interaction between 'average truck fuel economy' and 'gasoline 
prices' between 1975 and 2007 
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency (2007) and Energy Information 
Administration (2008) 
As Iain Carson and Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran (2007) argue, 
The bigger problem is that the industries do a brilliant job of conflating 
their narrow self interest with the larger national interests. In other 
words, oil and car bosses somehow manage to persuade Americans 
that what's bad for GM must be bad for America. And they have 
succeeded with this tactic because the Washington policy apparatus -
its historical memory and its very soul- was formed back in an era 
when oil was seen not only as plentiful but also as desirable, 
domestically produced, and downright good for you. (p. 34) 
During this lost decade in terms of fuel efficiencies, the U.S. automobile 
industry was not successful at technological innovations and bettering fuel economies 
any further to reach the goals set initially: 
...efficiency improvements since the mid-1980s have been used in the 
United States to increase private benefits - more power, larger 
vehicles, and more accessories (including all-wheel drive) - and not 
for public benefits of reduced oil imports and greenhouse gas 
emissions. (Lutsey and Sperling, 2005 p. 17) 
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9 
When the fuel economy standards were introduced in 1975, trucks constituted only 
20% of all vehicle sales in the US. However, according to EPA's data, trucks climbed 
to be 5 1 % of the light-duty vehicle production in 2007. Between 1975 and 2007 the 
biggest market share increase has been for SUVs, from 2% in 1975 to 29% in 2007. 
In the same period the share of car sales decreased from 70% to 50%. 
After a period of stagnation in terms of fuel economy, the declining pattern 
was reversed where the combined average fuel economies of cars and light-trucks 
began to improve again from 2004 forward while oil prices were increasing steadily. 
"The increases in 2005 and 2006 are the first consecutive annual increases in fuel 
economy since the mid-1980s. This reverses a long trend of slowly declining fuel 
economy since the 1987 peak" (EPA, 2007 p. iii). EPA also points out that gains in 
terms of fuel economy in 2005 and 2006 were reached by technological innovations 
of manufacturers as opposed to the usual practice of weight reduction between 1975 
and 1987. "Average light-duty vehicle weight dropped in both model years 2005 and 
2006, with a slight increase in weight of cars was more than offset by a larger 
decrease in truck weight and a decrease in truck market share" (EPA, 2007 p. v). 
Expectations regarding higher oil prices and higher CAFE standards might have 
played a role in this anomaly. In the next decade as a result of new higher CAFE 
standards and increasing oil prices, better fuel economy levels are likely to be 
reached. 
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GM Market ing G r o u p 
Fue l E c o n o m y b y M o d e l Year 
(Three Y e a r M o v i n g A v e r a g e ) 
4H9 
laboratory 5 5 / 4 5 IUIPQ Fereerrf Truck 
a s . 
20 -
1MB -
f - r - n m 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Model Year 
Figure 5: GM and fuel economy (1976-2006) 
Source: EPA (2007) 
CAFE standards: GM and Toyota 
As seen in Figure 5, GM displays a pattern that mimics the industry average in 
terms of fuel economy. After the peak of 1987, car fuel economies fluctuated with a 
slight upward trend approximating 30 mpg toward the end of the period. Meanwhile 
trucks stagnated until the last few years. Overall, improvement in combined fuel 
economy from 2004 forward was due merely to trucks. 
Toyota displays a somewhat unusual pattern after the 1975 legislation. As 
seen in Figure 6, Toyota cars had already higher fuel economies to begin with and 
improved even further by 1985 hitting 30 mpg. Then fuel economies drop again, and 
conform to the rest of the industry. 
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T o y o t a Marketing Group 
Fuel E c o n o m y b y Model Year 
{Three Year Moving A v e r a g e ) 
Laboratory 55/45 M P G 
- 100% 
"IS- Percenf Thuaig. ^ ^ „ « . - 150%. 
Figure 6: Toyota and fuel economy (1976-2006) 
Source: EPA (2007) 
However, unlike the rest of the industry, Toyota cars start improving again from the 
mid-90s on and approximate 35 mpg toward the end of the period. Toyota trucks 
display a similar, though less dramatic, upswing only a few years ago. Overall, the 
average fuel economy has significantly improved since the beginning of 2000. 
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CHAPTER EI 
ADVANTAGES OF NEW CAFE STANDARDS 
In this chapter, we will compare the new CAFE standards with the former 
standards and also an alternative policy to reduce gasoline consumption, namely 
gasoline tax. 
Drawbacks of 1975 CAFE standards 
1975 CAFE standards set a single standard for cars (27.5 mpg) regardless of 
the manufacturer or relative size of the vehicle. This has encouraged automakers to 
change the composition of their fleet in favor of smaller cars to meet the standards. 
Since lighter vehicles tend to sacrifice safety, regulating automobile fuel economy has 
always been criticized by some. 
Klein et al. found that there was a 10 percent increase in fatality risk 
associated with a 1.000-lb reduction in vehicle weight in single-
vehicle, non-rollover crashes ... The downsizing and weight reduction 
that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s most likely produced 
between 1,300 and 2,600 crash fatalities and between 13,000 and 
26,000 serious injuries in 1993. However, the proportion of these 
casualties attributable to CAFE standards is uncertain. (NRC, 2002 p. 
75-77) 
However, new CAFE standards under a reformed "attribute-based" structure 














Because each vehicle model has its own target (based on the attribute 
chosen), attribute-based standards provide no incentive to build 
smaller vehicles simply to meet a fleet-wide average, because the 
smaller vehicles will be subject to more stringent fuel economy and 
emissions targets. (NHTSA, 2008 p. 137) 
Therefore, the attribute-based system is expected to provide manufacturers 
with incentives to engage in technological improvements to better their fuel economy 
standards since "attribute-based standards are individualized for each manufacturer's 
different product mix" (NHTSA, 2008 p. 136). In other words, as vehicles get smaller 
the standards that apply to them would increase. This means that producing a lighter 
fleet would automatically require higher standards by limiting the ability to meet 
standards by merely changing the size of fleet. Consequently, "fuel savings and 
emissions reductions will always be higher under an attribute-based system than 
under a comparable industry-wide standard" (NHTSA, 2008 p. 136). 
Why not a "gasoline tax"? 
The main purpose of the new CAFE regulation is to reduce U.S. oil 
consumption in the long-term. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects that 
changes in new CAFE standards will lead to reduction in the use of oil. 
As a result of the increase in CAFE standards for automobiles and 
light-trucks, CBO expects saving in motor fuel use by 2017 of over 5 
billion gallons - or between 2% and 3% of total motor fuel use 
expected in that year without the change in law. (CBO, 2008 p. 8) 
Once the ultimate goal is set to be fuel saving, one might wonder if there are 
alternative ways to achieve it besides higher CAFE standards. For example, The 
National Research Council (2002) suggested that higher gasoline taxes as an 



















...a tax increase would provide direct incentives for consumers to buy 
and for manufacturers to produce higher fuel-economy new vehicles 
and would also provide incentives to reduce the use of all new and 
existing vehicles" (NRC, 2002 p. 88). NRC also emphasized that... a 
gasoline tax would have an immediate broad impact on gasoline 
consumption ...(NRC, 2002 p. 93) 
David Austin and Terry Dinan (2005) estimated that a 3.8 mpg increase in the 
CAFE standards will reduce gasoline consumption by 10% after 14 years. And then 
the authors investigated whether the same gasoline saving could be achieved with a 
higher gasoline tax: 
A tax designed to save the same amount of gasoline as the more 
stringent CAFE standards would accumulate savings much earlier 
because ... the tax would immediately discourage driving of new and 
old vehicles alike, in addition to encouraging the purchase of more 
fuel-efficient vehicles. (Austin and Dinan, 2005 p. 576) 
Mark R. Jacobsen (2007) finds that".. .increasing the stringency of CAFE will 
be much more costly relative to the amount of gasoline conserved and will fall 
disproportionately on domestic firms and low-income households" (Jacobsen, 2007 
p.30). He goes on to support his argument with the following estimate: 
When simulating a one mile per gallon increase in the standard, I find 
that average household gasoline use is reduced by more than 3%. An 
examination of the gross welfare costs, however, suggests that the 
same reduction can be accomplished for less than one-sixth the cost by 
increasing gasoline taxes rather than using the CAFE instrument. 
(Jacobsen, 2007 p. 3) 
Portney et al. (2003) survey arguments on, so-called, "rebound effects" as 
probable consequence of CAFE standards. Since higher CAFE standards will reduce 
gas bill per mile, more driving might be encouraged. Therefore, the authors conclude 
that because of this counteracting effect, increasing fuel economy standards would 























projected by some. Even though these authors do not mean to make a case for a 
gasoline-tax proposal in their study, their arguments seem to provide support for that. 
To sum up, the new legislation eliminates some of the drawbacks of the 1975 
standards while having some advantages over higher gasoline tax policy whose 
details will be discussed in the following sections. Even though the new legislation 
might not discourage driving as effectively as a gasoline tax would, it 
(i) would not seem to compromise safety, and promotes innovation instead of 
bettering fuel economies, 
(ii) transition would not place the burden on consumers but manufacturers and 
be politically more acceptable, 
(iii) would offer a longer period of transition for manufacturers, and 
(iv) more importantly, seems to favor domestic manufacturers by forcing them 
to stay competitive. 
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WHAT WILL THE TRANSITION TO THE CAFE LOOK LIKE? 
In this section, we will survey several arguments (for and against CAFE) that 
might help us project the transition to the new legislation. We will analyze how 
profitability, consumers and technological innovation might respond to tighter CAFE 
standards. 
CAFE and profitability 
Andrew N. Kleit (2002) surveys major arguments opposed to tighter CAFE 
standards. The author believes that CAFE standards are poor policy tools to save 
gasoline and criticizes National Research Council's July 2001 Report that proposes 
50% increase in CAFE standards for cars and light-trucks. Instead, he recommends, 
policy makers should consider raising gasoline tax. The author finds, 
... increasing the CAFE standards by 50% would cause far more harm 
to the economy. It would have reduced annual profits at General 
Motors by $3,824 billion, at Ford by $3,423 billion, and at Chrysler by 
$1,959 billion. Total losses to U.S. automakers would amount to 
$9,206 billion. In contrast, foreign manufacturers would see an 
increase in profits of $4,434 billion. Consumer surplus would decline 
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Similarly, Rasha Ahmed and Kathleen Segerson (2007) survey empirical 
studies in the literature to show that CAFE regulations will affect the producers 
adversely: 
CAFE regulation has negatively affected producers' profit and that the 
automobiles industry continues to resist all attempts to tighten CAFE 
(Kleit, 1990, Leone and Parkinson, 1990, Goldberg 1998 and Kleit, 
2002). Automakers claim that the new regulation that requires raising 
CAFE to 35 mpg by 2020, will cost them $83 billion (Taylor IE, 
2007). (Ahmed and Segerson, 2007 p. 6) 
Despite the opponents of the new legislation, there is a growing number of 
authors supporting CAFE standards and projecting alternative scenarios through 
which the automobile industry will benefit from more stringent CAFE regulations. 
Walter S. McManus (2007) suggests that new CAFE regulations could yield 
dramatically different impacts for the competitive position of individual automakers 
than the previous system. The report prepared for University of Michigan 
Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) analyzes the economic impacts of 
legislative proposal of new CAFE standards before it became law. The main 
arguments of the report are the following: 
Since reformed CAFE Standards set standards on a vehicle attribute basis 
such as size, companies with a higher share of larger vehicles (captured by larger 
footprints) in their production including the three biggest US automotive 
manufacturers, Ford, GM and Chrysler (the so-called Big 3) will face less stringent 
conditions. Detroit might end up gaining in terms of market share and profits under 
the new fuel economy standards. McManus projects, for example, GM's whole fleet, 
cars and trucks combined, to be 33.4 mpg on average. The same figure will be 37.5 
mpg on average for Toyota for the industry target of 35 mpg to be reached by 2020. 
t 
















This will improve the competitive position of the American automakers and their 
workers. 
McManus also sees the new standards as a 'win-win' game. 
Higher standards will require automakers to install more expensive 
equipment on vehicles; however, higher initial costs will be more than 
offset by fuel savings. For example, the cumulative cost of raising fuel 
economy to 35 mpg by 2018 is $0.51 per gallon saved—about one-
sixth of today's fuel price. (McManus, 2007 p. 3) 
He goes on to argue that "higher CAFE standards can increase vehicle profits 
since vehicle prices will need to rise to pay for added fuel-saving technologies, and 
profits per vehicle will also rise (assuming ordinary profit margins)." However, he 
also mentions a partial offset that might be caused "by slower growth in total vehicle 
sales caused by the higher prices." 
American producers facing lower CAFE standards will benefit the most: 
... with product portfolios that are more concentrated in vehicle 
segments with lower fuel economy and higher prices (SUVs and 
pickups), Detroit automakers will be making improvements that have 
higher market value and higher profit margins. Their profits will be 
correspondingly higher. (McManus, 2007 p. 4) 
As rising fuel prices encourage a switch to more fuel efficient cars on the part 
of consumers, the compliance with 2007 CAFE standards will help domestic 
producers to better their fleet to serve this growing demand. 
CAFE and consumers 
In the literature there is also ongoing debate as to how consumer decisions and 
welfare might be affected by higher fuel economy standards. Do consumers consider 
gasoline costs and prefer the models with higher miles per gallon? According to 
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Thomas S. Turrentine and Kenneth S. Kurani (2006), car buyers do not pay close 
attention to the share of gasoline costs in their household budgets. The authors used 
data retrieved through semistructured interviews with 57 households across nine 
lifestyle "sectors". They go on to argue, this is mainly because "they do not have the 
basic building blocks of knowledge assumed by the model of economically rational 
decision-making, and they make large errors estimating gasoline costs and savings 
over time" (Turrentine and Kurani, 2006 p. 12-13). 
The research concludes that consumer reaction to higher gasoline prices and 
fuel economy standards might prove to be different from what experts and economic 
models expect. Nevertheless, one might fairly argue that this will likely change in the 
face of $4.00 per gallon fuel in the U.S. 
i 
Contrary to this view, McManus (2006) by estimating a hedonic regression 
with data on sales, prices, and attributes of vehicles in 2005 finds that consumers are 
willing to pay, on average, $578 more for one mile per gallon improvement: 
At the price of gasoline prevailing in 2005, $2.30 per gallon, the $578 
per mpg that consumers are willing to pay for fuel economy implies 
that consumers put more weight in choosing vehicles on future fuel 
savings than most analysts (including ourselves) had thought. 
(McManus, 2006 p. 2) 
Given that gas prices nearly double its 2005 levels, this 'willingness to pay' can be 
safely expected to be even higher in the future - which gives manufacturers an 
additional motivation to better their fuel economies to stay competitive. 
Similarly, Molly Espey and Santosh Nair (2005) suggest that automobile 









Contrary to this view, McManus (2006) by estimating a hedonic regression 
with data on sales, prices, and attributes of vehicles in 2005 finds that consumers are 





fuel economy. Their research indicates that consumers are behaving rationally in this 
very sense. 
This research might also help in understanding decisions regarding 
adoption of alternative technologies such as hybrid vehicles. This 
research suggests that consumers are likely to accurately value fuel 
cost savings associated with such vehicles, leading to rational adoption 
based on fuel cost savings, at least once they become more informed 
about and familiar with the features of such vehicles. Of course, other 
benefits such as reduced pollution, reduced global warming, or 
reduced energy dependency may also be associated with improved fuel 
economy, and while this research cannot determine why people value 
fuel economy, it has nonetheless found that they do positively value it 
and pay for it via higher automobile prices, all else being equal. (Espey 
et al., 2005 p. 223) 
CAFE and innovation 
Hybrid vehicles that combine a gasoline engine with an electric motor and 
battery system may comprise more cars in the future due to their higher fuel economy 
levels. How quickly the percentage of hybrids increases will be dependent on 
willingness to pay on the side of consumers and on future gasoline prices. It seems 
today that production of hybrid cars will increase in the next years as a transition to 
the legislation. 
Since 2000 there has been an increase in hybrid car production. According to 
Kelly Sims Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger (2008) rising gasoline prices have given 
rise to higher hybrid sales. 
In 2000, the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius were the only hybrid 
vehicles available and collectively sold fewer than 3,000 units. Over 
the next six years manufacturers introduced nine other models. Honda 
launched hybrid versions of the Civic and Accord in 2002 and 2004, 
and Ford introduced a hybrid version of the Escape small SUV. In 
2005, the Lexus RX400h, Toyota Highlander, and Mercury Mariner 
were launched, and in 2006, the Lexus GS450H, Saturn Vue, and 














2006, more than 250,000 hybrid vehicles were sold. (Gallagher and 
Muehlegger, 2008 p. 3) 
Government put in place new incentives such as tax credits in 2000 to 
stimulate consumer adoption of hybrid technology. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) 
analyzed the role of federal and local incentives in promoting hybrid sales. Their 
paper suggests that tax incentives and rising gasoline prices combined with social 
preferences are associated with 6, 27 and 36%, respectively, of economy hybrid sales 
from 2000 to 2006. Recent CAFE regulations seem to accelerate the switch to hybrid 
sales in coming years. David L Greene et al (2004) estimated possible increase of 
hybrid sales by 2012 even in the absence of any new CAFE standards and current tax 
incentives. The results are below: 
By 2008, hybrids could capture 4-7% of the light-duty market. These 
shares could increase to 10-15% for hybrids and 4-7% for diesels by 
2012. The resulting impacts on fleet average fuel economy would be 
about +2% in 2008 and +4% in 2012. Hybrids must reduce costs to 
roughly half the cost increment of the first generation hybrids, a goal 
they are well on their way to reaching. If they can achieve these goals, 
diesels and hybrids should be able to capture 7-10% of the U.S. light-
duty vehicle market by 2008, and 15-20% by 2012. (David L Greene 
et al, 2004 p. 55) 
P. M. Flynn Hammet et al. (2004) also suggest that there will be many more 
hybrids and advanced diesels sold, as many as 1.8 million more, in the US in the 5 to 
8 years from 2004. 
Long-term plans announced by Toyota and GM, manufacturers on which we 
will concentrate, seem to provide support optimistic scenarios regarding share of 
hybrids. GM's Chairman Rick Wagoner has announced that GM will increase overall 
fuel economy improvements up to 20% by introducing a second-generation version of 





















models in North America and nine worldwide as stated in its March 4, 2008 press 
release. It was also indicated in GM's 2007 Annual Report that between 2007 and 
2010, GM is planning to introduce 16 new hybrid vehicles with an average of one 
every three months. 
Increasing demand for hybrid electric vehicles as a result of higher gasoline 
prices and declining preference for light-trucks in the US market are expected to 
motivate manufacturers to introduce new hybrid light-trucks alongside hybrid cars. 
By the end of 2008 GM will introduce three hybrid SUVs: 2008 Saturn VUE Green 
Line Hybrid with 32 mpg, 2008 Chevy Tahoe and GMC Yukon Hybrid expected to 
deliver 50% better city fuel economy as announced by GM. 
Toyota has been the market leader in terms of investment in new technologies 
to better fuel economies. Toyota's hybrid electric car Prius, first introduced in 1997, 
is becoming mass-produced today. As expressed in EPA's 2007 Fuel Economy 
Guide, Toyota Prius with 45 mpg (highway) standard is the most fuel-efficient car in 
the US automobile market gaining significant popularity among consumers with best-
ever April sales of 21,757 units in 2008, an increase of 53.8% over last April. 
Toyota had learned how to make very efficient cars that appeal to 
consumers, who keep coming back for more. Instead of having top-
heavy corporate structure with lots of divisions and different brands 
and dealer networks, like Ford and GM, Toyota kept itself quite 
simple. Its basic models such as the Corolla and Camry sell around the 
world, with only minor modifications for different markets. That way, 
it gets huge economics of scale. (Carson et al., 2007 p. 114) 
Toyota will expand its hybrid mix in the future to stay competitive in the 
market as stated in their North American Environmental Report: 
We have steadily increased our hybrid product offering since the Prius 
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Toyota hybrids (Prius, Highlander Hybrid and Camry Hybrid), and 
three Lexus hybrids (RX 400h, GS 450h and LS 600h L). We 
anticipate combined sales of Toyota and Lexus hybrids of quarter 
million units in North America during calendar year 2007. (2007 p. 16) 
Toyota may become more ambitious in the future by producing cheaper 
hybrid cars in order to keep its competitive advantage and leadership in terms of fuel 
economy improvements in the market. Toyota's executive Vice President Masatami 
Tokimoto said that "he expected hybrids to become the standard drive train and 










HOW WILL TOYOTA AND GM COMPLY WITH 
THE NEW CAFE STANDARDS? 
The research question that we raise is the following: How will automobile 
manufacturers achieve the fuel economy target suggested by NHTSA for 2015? We 
will concentrate on Toyota with market share of 17.5% (up from 15.8) and GM with 
market share of 20.7% (down form 23.1) as representatives of Japanese and American 
manufacturers, respectively. To this end, we discuss some scenarios through which 
the standards set for these two market leaders could be achieved by 2015. Before 
representing projections we will carry out about the transition to the new legislation, 
we will explain how CAFE actually works together with the presentation of the 
current status of actual fuel economies and our data source and methodology. 
How do new CAFE standards work? 
The attribute-based system relates fuel economy standards to vehicle 
footprints. A vehicle's footprint is basically a proxy for the size of the vehicle. 
NHTSA defines "footprint" as the average track width (the distance between the 
centerline of the tires) multiplied by wheelbase (the distance between the centers of 
the axles). "Each vehicle footprint value is assigned a mile per gallon target specific 














a b a j l - h etx-*V* 
w h e r e 
T = the fuel economy target (in m p g ) 
a = the m a x i m u m fuel economy target ( in m p g ) 
b = the m i n i m u m fuel economy target ( in m p g ) 
c = the footprint va lue ( in square feet) at w h i c h the fuel e c o n o m y target is 
m i d w a y b e t w e e n a and b 1 5 9 
d = the parameter ( in square feet) defining the rate at w h i c h the value o f 
targets decl ine f rom the largest to smallest va lues 
e = 2 . 7 1 S 1 6 0 
Parameters of the formula, a, b, c and d, are given by NHTSA (2008) which 
change with year and whether the vehicle is categorized as 'car' or 'light-truck'. The 
function suggests a negative correlation between the footprint (or the size) of the 
vehicle, captured by x above, and its mpg. In other words, as the vehicle gets smaller 
the function mandates a higher mpg, as seen in the Figure 7. For instance, a 2008 
Chevy Impala with a footprint of 55.94 should comply with 31.15 mpg by 2015 and 
is currently at 29 MPG. For the Toyota Yaris 2008 with footprint of 44.88, the CAFE 
standard is 36.91 in 2015. As seen in this example, size makes a difference. 
The new attribute-based CAFE standards suggest the following function/formula that 
calculates the minimum fuel economy targets set individually for each vehicle as the 
function of its footprints. 
/f r ula 
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Figure 7: Fuel economy standards as function of footprint 
Source: NHTSA (2008) 
Model, methodology and data 
To model the transition of Toyota and GM to the new CAFE standards, we 
focus on the total vehicle sales and mix in January through April of 2008. To simulate 
the consequences of several alternative scenarios, we work with a (best-seller) 
representative sample that consists of around 80% of total sales. This provides us the 
vehicle mix (e.g., % of trucks in total sales) and the average footprints that we need in 
calculating the discrepancy between the actual mpg today for each fleet and their 
required mpg by 2015. 
To simplify the analysis, we define and calculate "average car footprint," 
"average car actual mpg," "average truck footprint" and "average truck actual mpg" 
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Table 1: Fuel economy levels for Toyota and GM vehicles and percentage of trucks in 
total sales as of 2008 April 
Avg. car' Avg. car' 'Avg. truck' 'Avg. truck' %of %of 
footprint fuel economy footprint fuel economy trucks cars 
Toyota 50.12 35.04 mpg 0.03 23.05 mpg 3 57 
GM 53.68 30.07 mpg 3.83 21.25 mpg 4.8 45.2 
"Averages" are footprints and actual fuel economies weighted by sales of each 
brand's cars and trucks, included in the sample calculated as follows. Calculated 
values are given in Table 1: 
Average footprints = (Footprint of Vehicle A) x (Vehicle A sales/total sales) + 
(Footprint of Vehicle B) x (Vehicle B sales/total sales) + ... 
Average fuel economy (as highway mpg) = (Actual fuel economy of Vehicle 
A) x (Vehicle A sale/total sales) + (Actual fuel economy of Vehicle B) x (Vehicle B 
sale/total sales) + ... 
Vehicle mix appears to be 43% trucks and 47.5% cars and 9.5% hybrids for 
Toyota while, as shown in Table 1, 54.8% trucks and 45.2% for GM without any 
significant hybrid presence. In comparison, Toyota has a smaller fleet in both 
categories and more favorable fuel economies but is expected to be subject to higher 
















Table 2: The discrepancy between actual fuel economies today and 2015 targets set 













Toyota car 35.04 31.38 34.6 
31.5 
Toyota truck 23.05 25.80 28 
GM car 30.07 31.25 34.7 
30.3 
GM truck 21.26 25.08 27.4 
Based on the vehicle mix and sales as of April 2008, Toyota and GM can be 
calculated to have the actual fleet averages summarized in Table 2 by using the 
following formula: 
Total Production Volume 
WehicleA WehicleB WehicleC 
+ + 
FuelEconomy FuelEconomy FuelEconomy 
Table 2 summarizes (i) actual fuel economies for cars and trucks, (ii) the 
required fuel economies calculated by the CAFE function if the very same fleets and 
vehicle mix had been produced in 2015, (iii) the standards which NHTSA mandates 
Toyota and GM to meet by 2015 and finally (iv) combined fleet mpg once the 2015 
standards were met. 
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Fuel economy of Toyota cars appears to exceed the standards set by NHTSA 
for 2015, 34.6. Relatively speaking, GM seems to need a more drastic change in 
technology, especially in its light-truck division, to achieve these CAFE targets. 
This can be seen in the discrepancy between the actual fuel economies of 
today (30.07,21.26) and 2015 standards (34.7, 27.4). 
Let us briefly explain what the second column in Table 2 represents. Given 
average footprints, the defined fuel economies for average car and truck can be 
calculated plugging the average footprints into the CAFE function. This illustrates 
how attribute-based CAFE standards work. There seems to be a gap, except for 
Toyota in the car category, between fuel economy defined by the CAFE function and 
NHTSA targets for 2015 provided on Table 2. What does it mean? An immediate 
implication could be thought to be following: improving the current mix of vehicles 
to comply with the 2015 standards suggested by the CAFE function will not be 
sufficient to meet the targets set by NHTSA for 2015. This simply means Toyota and 
GM will have to do more than make the existing fleet more efficient up to standards 
implied by the CAFE function. In this context, we will bring forward two options: (i) 
smaller vehicles and (ii) increasing hybrid car and truck production. 
The last column in Table 2 was calculated by using the following formula 
where Ni and Ti represent shares of each vehicle in the fleet and required CAFE 
standards for each vehicle. We normalized N to 100. 
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In the rest of the study, we carry out some projections through which we will 
discuss how 2 0 1 5 targets could be attained with a comparative perspective. We 
assume that manufacturers will meet the 2 0 1 5 standards by producing smaller and 
higher-mpg (pure-gasoline-powered) vehicles as well as increasing the share of 
hybrid vehicles in their fleet. In other words, while average cars and trucks get 
smaller and more fuel-efficient, hybrid cars and trucks begin claming a larger share of 
total sales helping manufacturers better their average fuel economies for cars and 
trucks. To calculate steady annual changes in footprints and percentages of hybrid 
vehicles we used iteration as a method. We first calculate final values of these 
variables that help Toyota and GM achieve 2 0 1 5 standards. Secondly, we reason 
backward to find out annual changes in the variables that would produce these final 
values by using the following exponential growth formula where r and t denote 
percentage change and year, respectively: 
(Initial value)er 1 = final value 
CASE 1: How far are Toyota and GM from meeting 2 0 1 5 standards? 
As summarized in Figure 8, Toyota has already exceeded the 2 0 1 5 standards 
in the car category and requires improving fuel economy for the truck category 
annually by 2 . 9 % to meet the standards by 2 0 1 5 . On the other hand, GM cars and 
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Eventually, if the current vehicle mix is retained, the fuel economy for cars and trucks 
combined is calculated to be 31.52 mpg for Toyota and 30.31 mpg for GM with both 
below the required industry average of 31.6 by 2015 as seen in Figure 9. Toyota 
seems to have a much smoother path in complying with 2015 CAFE standards. 
CASE 2: Cars and CAFE standards 
As mentioned before, improving vehicles up to the fuel economy standards 
defined by the CAFE function (with 2015 parameters) would fall short of the NHTSA 
standards set for 2015. This could be thought to imply that cars are expected to be 
relatively smaller in size and the percentage of hybrids is expected to grow in total 
production for compliance. 
Under this case, we will simulate this option for GM cars - not Toyota since it 
has met the 2015 standards already. According to the new CAFE standards, vehicles 
are required to be more fuel-efficient as their footprints, as proxy for their size, 
decline. At this point, we ask the following question: Given the composition of the 
current car fleet, to what percentage should hybrid sales climb to achieve the 2015 
target (34.7 mpg) as footprints decline 1% a year? 
As followed in Figure 10, the average car size will decline to, as a virtual 
approximation, that of Pontiac Vibe 2008 by 2015. Meanwhile, GM car sales will 
decline by around 5% annually while 45-mpg hybrid car sales will gradually rise to 


















36 _ , 36 
34 34 
32 _ _ 32 















20 _ 20 
2009 2010 
Toyota Car Mpg 
Toyota Truck Mpg 
2011 2012 2013 
GM Car Mpg 
2014 2015 
—m GM Truck Mpg 
Figure 8: Compliance of Toyota and GM with 2015 standards for cars and trucks 
Source: Kelley Blue Book (2008), http://www.gm.com, http://www.toyota.com 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Toyota Fleet Mpg — ~ — GM Fleet Mpg 
Figure 9: Toyota and GM combined fleet fuel economies by 2015 as the 
compliance takes place 
Source: Kelley Blue Book (2008), http://www.gm.com, http://www.toyota.com 
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GM Car Footprint GM Hybrid Car (%) 
Figure 10: Necessary change in the share of hybrids, and footprints to comply with 
2015 targets set for cars 
Source: Kelley Blue Book (2008), http://www.gm.com, http://www.tovota.com 
CASE 3: Trucks and CAFE standards 
Similar to the experiment carried out under Case 2, we will simulate 
percentages of hybrids in total truck sales that allow Toyota and GM to comply with 
the fuel economy standards set for trucks by 2015 as footprints decline 1% a year. 
As seen in Figure 11, the average truck size will decline to, as a virtual 
approximation, that of Highlander SUV 2008 for Toyota and Chevy Trailblazer 2008 
for GM by 2015. Meanwhile, Toyota and GM regular truck sales will decline by 
around 4% and 4.5%, respectively, each year while 32-mpg hybrid truck sales will 
gradually rise to 25.1% and 28.3% of total truck sales, respectively, to comply with 
the NHTSA standards set for trucks. 
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Figure 11: Necessary change in the share of hybrids, and footprints to comply with 
2015 targets set for trucks 
Source: Kelley Blue Book (2008), http://www.gm.com, http://www.tovota.com 
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Toyota and GM's future path 
NHTSA has set similar standards for GM and Toyota in both categories. In 
the category of cars, Toyota has already met the standards. GM needs to improve its 
cars by on average 1.21% each year to comply with the standards by 2015. Toyota 
seems capable of going beyond the CAFE standards in this category on its current 
path. As for trucks, both Toyota and GM have a similar path in adjusting the new 
standards set for category. 
Combined fleet average and cost of adjustment 
At the end of the adjustment process, the fuel efficiencies for the whole fleet -
cars and trucks combined - will be realized as 31.5 mpg for Toyota and 30.3 for GM 
with both below the industry target set by NHTSA for 2015. This means that some 
other competitors will be subject to higher standards (e.g., Honda cars with 36.4 mpg 
and Ford cars with 35.5 mpg) to elevate the industry average to 31.6 mpg. Toyota and 
GM, the top two manufacturers in the industry, seem to bear a proportionately lower 
cost of adjustment. However, in comparison to Toyota, GM can be claimed to have, 
even if minor, a cost advantage in transition with its combined fleet average being 
required to reach 30.3 mpg as opposed to 31.5 mpg. 
Vehicle mix matters 
All simulations were carried out with the current vehicle composition as of 
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for larger vehicles, which seems slightly in GM's advantage. In other words, CAFE 
standards will be sensitive to the vehicle composition in each category. However, this 
cost advantage that GM seems to enjoy might cause its market share to decline as 
consumer preferences shift away from light-trucks and SUVs to smaller and more 
fuel-efficient cars, as Espey and Nair (2005) predict. This would have altered 
McManus's (2007) predictions regarding profitability and market share of GM. If 
willingness-to-pay for higher efficiencies continues to dominate consumer decisions 
in the face of permanently high gas prices, the competitive position of GM will be 
contingent on its vehicle mix. The latest plan announced by GM Chairman and chief 
executive, Rick Wagoner, of ceasing production at four North American assembly 
plants that make SUVs and pickups by 2010 seems to be in line with this prediction 
(Vlasic, 2008). 
Higher fuel efficiencies possible 
Given the influence of higher oil prices that are expected to prevail in the 
future and the competition pressure, we expect that the new standards will be more 
effective than expected in improving fuel efficiencies. As Chairman of the Center for 
Automotive Research, David Cole puts it; "You're going to see people trying to kill 
each other over how green they can be." (quoted by Maynard, 2007 n.p.). 
What is CAFE good for 
The fundamental question appears to be what CAFE is good for. Will it really 
help reduce greenhouse gas emission? Does it only help GM to stay competitive in 
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the market? We think that CAFE is relatively a more politically motivated policy 
measure compared with gasoline tax. 
As oppose to a gasoline tax, which is claimed to be more effective to reduce 
oil consumption, CAFE standards seem to allow GM to compete more easily with 
Toyota, which has a ready competitive advantage in terms of fuel economies. In 
absence of any regulation on fuel economy, GM would have lost market share with 
its current fleet as a result of permanently higher oil prices. The new legislation could 
be thought to provide GM and other US manufacturers a road map to be able to 
compete with their Japanese rivals which have entered the high-gas-prices era readier 
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